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Abstract
This paper analyses the wage demands of a sector-level monopoly union facing internationally
mobile rms. A simple two-country economic geography model is used to describe how rms
relocate in function of international dierences in production costs and market size. The
union sets wages in function of the rm level labour demand elasticity and the responsiveness
of rms to relocate internationally. If countries are suciently symmetric lower foreign wages
and lower trade costs necessarily lead to lower union wage demands. With asymmetric
countries these intuitive properties do not always hold. But even for symmetric countries it
holds that small increases in market size or trade costs makes union wages more sensitive to
the foreign wage level.
Key words: Unions, globalisation, economic geography JEL: J50, J31, F16
1. Introduction
After a period of spiralling ination, rising labour costs, numerous rm closures and
increasing unemployment the Belgian government decided to impose a nation-wide maximum
yearly wage increase for sectoral labour agreements in 1988. It was hoped such legislation
would promote employment and pre-emptively secure the international competitiveness of
the country. Since 1996 this maximum wage increase has been calculated bi-yearly as an
explicit function of the average wage evolution in the neighbouring countries. Employees
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January 8, 2009and unions tend to be less supportive of limiting wages as a means of securing employment
and some rather point to `articially low' wages in foreign countries as the main cause of
unemployment and rm relocation. What is common in the view of government and workers,
however, is the perception of local and foreign wages as being strategic variables which can be
used to attract foreign rms and increase employment. Viewing wages as strategic variables
raises many questions: is lowering wages instrumental to attracting rms and increasing
employment? Does tying wages to the foreign level secure employment? Does freer trade
lead to race-to-the-bottom wage competition between countries?
Such questions are immaterial in classical models of international trade as they mostly
rely on perfect product and labour markets where there are no rm prots and wages are
purely competitive. Starting with Brander and Spencer (1988) and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos
(1991), however, quite a few authors have analysed unionised labour markets in the context
of oligopolistic competition with immobile rms, or allowing for FDI as in the model of
Konings and Vandenbussche (1998). The eect of falling trade costs on wages is a central
research question in this strand of literature, such as for Naylor (1999) who also solves for
the international Nash-equilibrium with wage bargaining occurring simultaneously in two
symmetric countries.
Picard and Toulemonde (2003, 2006), De Bruyne (2004) and Munch (2003), among others,
consider the eects of unionisation on the location choice of rms within economic geography
models. In this paper we also use a NEG model with perfectly mobile rms, but rather
focus on how the rms' location choice aects union wage demands. We start from a simple
NEG model explaining where rms locate in function of international dierences in market
access, wages, labour productivity and trade costs. Unions then fully take into account how
their wage demands aect labour demand and the international distribution of rms. The
fact unions are explicitly aware of the possibility of rm relocation makes our model quite
dierent from a part of the existing literature on union behaviour in an economic geography
context, and our ndings point out some inconsistencies in popular models.
Our approach is related to models of international tax competition with mobile rms
such as for example Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin
and Krugman (2004)). In these models a government has to strike a balance when increasing
taxes as some of the tax base is lost when rms start relocating in response. When all rms
prefer to locate in a single country where they earn higher prots, however, this international
prot dierential allows a government to tax without causing relocation. Similarly, in our
model, if all rms prefer to locate in a single country the existence of agglomeration rents
2allows wages to be increased up to a certain level without causing rm relocation. But
a union acting on the sector level might nd it optimal to set higher wages despite the
relocation of some rms. We show the exact wage demand then depends on how many rms
relocate for a given wage change. Through the introduction of a simple NEG model we are
able to quantify both the `wage elasticity of rm relocation' and the size of the agglomeration
rents which determine union wage demands in case both countries contain rms and when
all rms locate in a single country, respectively.
A key question we address using this model is whether lower trade costs necessarily
lead to a lower wage demand. We nd this intuition only holds if countries are suciently
symmetric in terms of labour productivity and market size. For asymmetric countries a larger
market size or the existence of a comparative advantage can induce all rms to agglomerate
in a single country. With full agglomeration prots are no longer equalised internationally
and the resulting agglomeration rents are appropriated by the union in the form of higher
wages. As agglomeration rents are a hump-shaped function of trade freeness in the larger
country, so are wages. But even when both countries contain rms, union wage demands
may increase after trade liberalisation. This might help explain why some studies nd proof
of wage divergence between large EU member states after the major trade reforms of 1992,
rather than convergence (see Webber, 2002; Webber and White, 2003).
Another counter-intuitive result of our model is that an exogenous decrease in the level of
foreign wages does not necessarily lead to lower local union wage demands. Union wages thus
do not act as strategic complements in an international context. This is surprising, as the
manufacturing varieties produced by the unionised rms in both countries are substitutes in
the model. The reason is that, although lower foreign wages cause some rms to relocate as
long as both countries contain rms (and this runs counter to union interests), the marginal
propensity of rms to relocate may actually decrease after the foreign wage decrease, leading
to higher optimal union wage demands in the remaining local rms.
Moreover, it turns out that, at least for small changes around the symmetric case, larger,
more closed countries are more sensitive to the foreign wage level. The reason is that,
although the `direct' eect of a larger market size is to make union wages less sensible to
foreign wage changes, these changes also induce unions to increase their wage demands. As
higher wages are more sensitive to foreign wage changes, it turns out that the total eect is
that union wages become more sensitive to changes in the foreign wage level.
This paper consists of three sections after the introduction. Section 2 introduces a simple
NEG model where wages are taken as given. We consider the eect of exogenous wage
3changes on rm prots and the equilibrium international distribution of rms. In section
3 wages are set by a monopoly union which fully takes into account the results on rm
behaviour. We determine how union wage demands react to changes in transport costs,
foreign wages, and market size; and how the sensitivity of union wage demands with respect
to foreign wage changes is aected by the market size of a country and the level of trade
costs. A nal section concludes.
2. A simple two-country NEG model
In this section we adapt the two-country footloose-capital model of Martin and Rogers
(1995), allowing for international dierences in wages and labour productivity. We establish
how rms relocate in response to changes in the manufacturing wage, under which conditions
all rms agglomerate in a single country and determine the agglomeration rents (international
prot dierential) which may result if this occurs. Throughout this section we take wages in
both countries as given.
2.1. Model Setup
There are two countries, H and F. As in P uger (2004) the utility function of the
representative consumer in both countries is quasi-linear in a homogeneous good CA and a
CES-composite of manufacturing varieties CM.







 > 0;  > 1:
Constrained utility maximisation gives rise to a simple demand function for the CES-
composite CM = P
 1




1  is the price-index of manufacturing goods
consumed in country k. Demand for the homogeneous good is the residual of the individual
income after subtracting expenditures on manufacturing goods, or CA = Y  . The demand
function of a typical consumer in country k for a manufacturing variety qjk produced in








j;k 2 fH;Fg: (1)
Because of the quasi-linear utility specication, the demand for manufacturing goods of the
typical consumer does not depend on her income. Total demand in k is simply the demand
of the typical consumer times the exogenously given mass of consumers Mk in the country.
4The homogeneous good A-sector is kept as simple as possible. We assume A-sector rms
use a constant returns to scale technology with labour as the sole input. Countries may have
dierent labour productivities. We write 1=j for the quantity of labour required in country j
to obtain one productivity-equivalent unit of labour and w
A
j for the reward to labour. Perfect
competition in the A-sector leads to marginal cost pricing. Assuming costless trade implies
prices, and therefore marginal costs, are equalised internationally. Choosing the A-sector
good as the num eraire implies p
A = 1. The result is productivity-adjusted international wage











A = 1 or w
A
H = H and w
A
F = F:
Unlike the A-sector rms, a manufacturing rm in country j faces a xed cost in that it
requires a single unit of capital at price rj irrespective of the output level. For the variable
part of production 1=j units of labour are required per unit of output. The representative
country j manufacturing rm's cost for producing x units of output is




wj=j measures the labour cost of producing one extra unit of manufacturing output, the
manufacturing unit labour cost in country j. Throughout, we assume wH  w
A
H (and in the
next section the union will be shown to optimally set wages such that this holds). There is
perfect labour mobility between the CRS and manufacturing sector, with the CRS sector
absorbing all labour which is not hired by the manufacturing rms.
Manufacturing rms operate under monopolistic competition. Prot maximisation implies
rms set consumer prices at a constant markup over marginal costs. The consumer price
charged by a manufacturing rm located in country j for sales in country k is
pjj = wj=j j 2 fH;Fg (local sales)
pjk = wj=j = pjj j;k 2 fH;Fg; j 6= k (exports)
(2)
where we introduce  = 
 1 to denote the xed markup of price over marginal costs.
Assuming symmetric iceberg transport costs  > 1 for selling abroad, exports are subject to
higher marginal costs and subsequently are sold at a proportionally higher consumer price.
We assume the amount of capital in the world is xed and normalise it to one. Using the





























[n + c(1   n)]
1
1  :
The indices are composed of a term stemming from sales of domestic rms and a terms
stemming from imports. These are weighted by the number (or share) of rms in each country
(there are n rms in H and 1 n rms in F), a parameter measuring trade freeness   1 








A higher  means freer trade and a higher c corresponds to higher relative unit labour costs
in country H.
Given the above pricing rules and taking into account that due to iceberg transport
costs x units of output have to be produced to sell x units abroad, operating prots are
proportional to sales:
 = pjjxjj + pjjxjk  
wj
j




Given the xed supply of capital its reward is bid up to the point where all these operating
prots accrue to capital. Substituting the optimal pricing rules from equation (2) and
























H = n + c(1   n)
F = n + c(1   n):
(3)
Here we write m for the share of world expenditure on manufactures in country H. Because
per capita expenditure on manufacturing is xed by the quasi-linear utility specication, the
expenditure share of H is simply the share of consumers MH=MW located in the country.
Moreover, as in the footloose-capital model of Martin and Rogers (1995) we assume capital to
be mobile but the capital owners and consumers to be immobile. The share of manufacturing
6expenditures in a country then is exogenous. Normalising the world mass of consumers
MW = 1, the market share of H is 0 < m < 1 and 1   m for country F.
The expressions for the reward to capital in both countries closely resemble these for
rm sales in the classic core periphery model of Krugman (1991), as shown, for example,
in equation (2.12) of Baldwin et al. (2003).1 Our model is rather dierent in essence,
however, as we assume capital rather than workers relocate and in our model expenditures
on manufacturing in a country are exogenous due to the linear utility specication and the
immobility of capital owners and consumers.
2.2. Interior equilibrium
Capital is mobile and is relocated to the country with the highest reward until prots
are equalised (dening the long-run interior equilibrium), or until all capital is located in a
single country (dening a corner solution). The capital owners are assumed to be immobile
and therefore seek to maximise nominal returns. Equating the expressions for the return to
capital from equation (3) and solving for n we obtain following expression for the unique
interior long-run equilibrium share of capital in country H:
n = c
(1   2)m   (c   )
(c   )(1   c)
if 0 < n < 1: (4)
Following properties can be easily shown to hold.
Proposition 1. For interior solutions, with exogenous wages, the share of manufacturing
rms in a country is decreasing in its relative labour cost and increasing in its market size.
A home-market eect holds as @n/@m > 1.
Figure 1 illustrates how n depends on the market size m (left panel) and wages wH (right
panel). The home-market eect is at work in our model as @n/@m > 1: an increase in
the expenditure share leads to a more than proportional increase in a country's share of
manufacturing. Note that in the right panel, starting from the symmetric equilibrium,
subsequent changes in wages have an increasing eect on the interior equilibrium distribution
of rms: the curve n becomes steeper for extreme values of wH. This will play an important
role for the optimal union wage determination in section 3.
The eect of the trade freeness parameter  on the interior distribution of capital n
depends on the direction of production cost and market size asymmetries. Dierentiating
1Divide by  to obtain operating prots, divide numerator and denominator by the foreign wage level,
take into account our normalisation of the world supply of both capital and total expenditures to one and
apply our denition of c and m.






















Figure 1: The eect of the relative market size (left panel) and production costs (right panel) on a country's
share of manufacturing rms.
n with respect to  shows that if wages are lower in the larger country, say H, freer trade
(increasing ) always leads to an increase in n. If wages are higher in H, but its size advantage
is large enough with respect to the wage handicap in that m > c2=(1 + c2), rms initially
increasingly locate in H for higher . For suciently high , however, rms eventually
relocate toward the low wage country. For perfectly free trade only the production cost
dierential matters to rm prots: rms costlessly transport goods from the low wage country
to where consumers are located. The following proposition therefore holds:
Proposition 2. For interior solutions and exogenous wages,
The share of rms in a large, low wage country always increases with freer trade. The
share of rms in a small, high wage country always decreases with freer trade.
There exists a range of trade freeness where a large high-wage country attracts an increasing
share of rms when trade becomes freer, provided its market is suciently large compared to
its wage handicap. The condition is m > c2=(1 + c2) for country H.
There exists a level of  < 1 above which rms increasingly locate toward the low-wage
country irrespective of any market size asymmetry.
2.3. Corner solutions
Propositions 1 and 2 describe how changes in c, m and  aect the interior equilibrium
distribution of rms as dened by equation (4). As H's share of rms is strictly decreasing
in its labour costs and the world supply of capital (and thus rms) is xed, there exists a
critical level c
CH of labour costs c below which all rms nd it optimal to locate in H. The




1   m(1   2)
:













1   4c2m(1   m)
2cm
:
If c < 1 and m > 1=2, the upper critical value 
CH2 is irrelevant (as it is larger than one): all
rms remain in H for all  > 
CH1 (see proposition 2). If c > 1 and m < 1=2, both critical
values are irrelevant, as the combined market size and cost advantage of F make it impossible
for H to attract the industrial core for any level of trade freeness. The isomorphic critical
value for full agglomeration in F (n = 0) is
c > c
CF 
2 + m(1   2)

:
All equations and propositions relating to interior solutions are valid only if both countries
contain rms, or c
CH < c < c
CF. It can be easily veried that c > c
CH implies 1 c > 0 and
c < c
CF implies c    > 0. These conditions are weaker but often turn out to be suciently
strong to sign equations. Following proposition summarises these results on the critical values
for full agglomeration.
Proposition 3. If asymmetries are suciently large compared to transportation costs, full
agglomeration occurs. With c < c
CH 

1 m(1 2) all rms agglomerate in H. If c > c
CF 
2+m(1 2)
 all rms agglomerate in F.
We will frequently use critical values in terms of absolute levels of wages rather then relative
unit labour costs. Writing w
CH
H for the level of wH for which all rms agglomerate in country
H and using the denition of c  (FwH=HwF) 1 we have c < c






2.4. The wage elasticity of the international rm distribution
We saw that for interior equilibria increasing wages decrease a country's share of rms.
It is convenient to express how fast small changes in wages cause international relocation of
2We use the superscript Cj to denote a critical level of a parameter or variable at which country j is
able to attract the industrial core.








= (1   )
m(1   2)(1   c2) + (c   )2
(c   )(1   c)(cCF   c)
< 0; if 0 < n < 1: (5)
When wages in H are increased up to the point where c approaches the level c
CF at which
all rms relocate to country F, 
H
reloc tends to minus innity as the elasticity expresses
@n/@wH < 0 relative to an ever smaller base of remaining rms n. From now on we refer to
the positive number j
H
relocj as the elasticity of relocation. A similar expression can be written
for changes in wF from the point of view of the foreign country.
The elasticity of relocation will be key to the wage setting decision of the union in section
3.
2.5. Agglomeration rents
When all rms locate in a single country this prevents relocation to act as corrective
arbitrage and (potential) prots may dier between countries. The resulting international
prot gap or agglomeration rents play an important role for the union when determining the
optimal wage demand. Taking the ratio of capital rents in both countries from equation (3),
we can conveniently express the agglomeration rents for a rm located in country H as
zH  rH=rF =
c
(1 m+2m) = c
CH=c if n = 1
zH  rH=rF = 1 if 0 < n < 1:
The agglomeration rents in H are higher the lower relative unit labour costs c are relative to
the critical level where all rms agglomerate in H, c
CH. In the knife-edge case c = c
CH and
for interior equilibria rms earn equal prots in both countries, rms are indierent between
locations and there are no agglomeration rents, or zH = 1. Some comparative statics of the
agglomeration rents in the core-periphery conguration n = 1 will prove useful in the next










1   m(1 + 2)
c[1   m(1   2)]2:
The rst two results are not surprising: as rms are attracted by low production costs and
large markets the agglomeration rents in H are decreasing in c and increasing in m. zH is




m > 1=2. Note that a smaller country can only attract the core if it has suciently low wages.
10Following proposition summarises the results on the eect of trade freeness on agglomeration
rents:
Proposition 4. If a relatively small or equally sized country attracts all rms, agglomeration
rents are monotonically increasing in the freeness of trade. If the larger country contains the
core, agglomeration rents are a hump-shaped function of .
2.6. Illustration
The eect of economic integration on the equilibrium distribution of rms n and the






















































































Figure 2: The share of manufacturing rms in country H (solid line, left scale) and the sensitivity of this
share to changes in productions costs j
H
relocj (dotted line, right scale), both as a function of trade freeness.
The left panel shows the case of a large wage handicap in country H (c = 1:18) with m = 2=3. The right
panel shows the case of a more moderate wage handicap c = 1:04.
panels m > c2=(1 + c2), so initially H attracts more rms as trade costs decline. In the left
panel there does not exist an intermediate interval of trade freeness where H can attract





relocj (dashed line) which are a measure for the footlooseness of rms initially
are monotonically increasing in  as long as both countries contain some rms. When 
approaches 
CF, the level where all rms leave H the sensitivity @n
@wH is expressed with respect
to an ever decreasing remaining share of rms n and j
H




relocj is locally zero: rms in F do not relocate in response (small) changes in the
F's wages when there exist agglomeration rents from locating in F. In the right panel the
3Such an interval exists if and only if c < 1=2
p
(1   m)m.
11production cost handicap of H is relatively moderate and it attracts the industrial core for
some intermediate interval of  due to its larger market size. Note that in the right panel
j
F
relocj (dashed line) rst becomes innitely large as  approaches 
CH1 and all rms locate





relocj declines over this interval.
3. Sector level union wage demands when rms are internationally mobile
So far we focused on the international distribution of rms, taking wages in both countries
as given. Now let the wage in H be set by a monopoly union operating at the sectoral
level. When determining the optimal wage, the union takes into account the aspects of
rm behaviour established in the previous section. When both countries contain rms
the union rationally anticipates that not all rms relocate for a small wage increase as
tighter competition abroad and softer domestic competition tend to equalise prots in both
countries before all rms relocated. In the case of full agglomeration, however, the existence
of agglomeration rents in a country allows wages to be increased up to some point without
causing any relocation. The union will exploit this property to appropriate all agglomeration
rents in the form of higher wages.
We rst determine the optimal union wage demand and derive its properties both for
interior equilibria and corner solutions. It is shown that (1) union wages are a non-monotonic
function of trade freeness if there exist asymmetries between countries and trade is suciently
free, (2) local union wage demands are not always increasing in the foreign wage level, (3)
freer trade or a smaller home-market do not necessarily make countries more sensitive to the
foreign wage level.
3.1. The optimal union wage demand
Assume a monopoly union acting on the level of the manufacturing sector under consid-
eration seeks to maximise
U = nl(wH   w
A
H): (6)
Union utility U equals the product of aggregate employment nl and the dierence between
the manufacturing wage wH and the A-sector wage w
A
H, which serves as a benchmark against
which union wages are gauged. It it assumed that the sector in which the union operates
is suciently small compared to the overall economy such that the union ignores the eect
its wage demands have on the economy-wide price level (the union does take into account





















H the optimal union wage implies an interior equilibrium (left panel). If w
CH
H is
suciently large compared to w
A




H [ and the union sets
wages at w
CH
H , attracting all rms (middle panel). If w
CH
H is only moderately higher than w
A
H the level of




reasonable assumption given the fact intermediate sector-level bargaining is widely observed
in practice4. Unions explicitly take into account that wage increases may cause some rms to
relocate and that individual rms will employ fewer workers, e.g. that n and l are functions
of wH. Under the given assumptions rm level labour demand is a simple function of wages
with l = (   1)=wH. The dependency of n on wH was described in sections 2.2 and 2.3.




H ] and is strictly positive




H [ and therefore necessarily reaches a maximum in this interval.5 Three cases
can be distinguished depending on the level of w
A
H relative to w
CH
H . These dierent cases are
illustrated in gure 3. The rst case is when w
CH









H [ and both countries contain
rms. The second case occurs when w
CH
H is suciently large relative to w
A
H. In this case the
union will set the wage at w
CH
H such that country H contains all rms. In the third case,
where w
CH
H is not much larger than w
A





H [. We now discuss the optimal union wage determination more in detail in
each of these cases.








H [ that w
CH
H < wH < w
CF
H such that at any
wage the union chooses in this interval 0 < n < 1 holds and equation (4) is relevant. The
4For example the union IG metal in Germany is likely to take into consideration the eects of its actions
on the international competitiveness of the sector, but even the actions of such a large union, when considered
in isolation, would have only a small eect on the overall German price level.




H as otherwise all rms would prefer to locate in country F, even with
manufacturing wages in H lowered to the A-sector level w
A
H.








if 0 < n < 1: (7)






= (1   )
m(1   2)(1   c2) + (c   )2
(c   )(1   c)(cCF   c)
< 0:
As reloc contains wH with non-integer exponents through c = (FwH=HwF)
 1 the union
wage can not generally be written as an explicit function of the model parameters for interior
equilibria. Despite this fact the exact properties of the optimal union wage can be determined
using the implicit function theorem.









rm level labour demand is given by ( 1)=wH union utility is proportional to (wH w
A
H)=wH
in this interval and therefore strictly increasing. A union wage wH < w
CH
H can therefore




H [ determines whether utility
reaches a maximum at w
CH




H [ (interior solution). The slope










































l =  1 and rearranging. Condition (8) holds if w





reloc is large (n(wH) is steep), which is the case if trade costs are low.




H ] and this is a sucient
condition for unions to set wH = w
CH









 1 if n = 1: (9)
6w
CH
H is large if H has a large market size and  is intermediate, or if H has a production cost advantage
and  is large (see the denition below proposition 3). In this case (wH   w
A
H)=wH  1 and the slope of U
will be determined by n, which is strictly decreasing in wH in this interval.
14Here wF is the wage which a rm would pay in country F, which is more of a virtual wage as
country F does not contain any rms. The optimal union wage demand for full agglomeration
is wH = w
CH
H , which implies zero agglomeration rents. Manufacturing workers therefore
appropriate all the agglomeration rents which rms would earn in the absence of unions in
the form of higher wages.





  2, U is concave and therefore union wages are set at @U /@wH = 0 where 0 < n < 1. If




H ] may be local and the corner solution wH = w
CH
H might
still be preferred by the union. As @U /@wH = 0 can not generally be solved for wH, the




H ] where @U /@wH = 0 and the utility
level at the corner solution w
CH
H must then be compared numerically.
Summarising, for low values of w
CH
H relative to w
A
H, the union optimally sets wages such




H this is always the
case. If w
CH
H , in contrast, is suciently high relative to w
A
H the optimal union wages equals
w
CH
H , the corner solution at which country H attracts all rms and rms are indierent





H , union utility at the interior equilibrium and the corner solution must be compared
numerically. The comparative static properties of the optimal union wage demand both in
the case of an interior solution and a corner solution can be determined analytically and we
turn to deriving these properties for both cases in the remainder of this paper.
3.2. Foreign wage changes and union wage demands
If union wages are set such that the country is able to attract all rms, union wages move
in line with the agglomeration rents. The agglomeration rents in a country are dened as the
ratio of prots in this country to the (potential) foreign prots. As is clear from equation (9)
a foreign potential wage increase (say an increase in the foreign alternative wage) makes the
foreign country less attractive, increasing the home country's agglomeration rents, leading to
a higher union wage demand.
Proposition 5. Under full agglomeration a foreign -potential- manufacturing wage increase
(decrease) leads to a local union wage increase (decrease).
The eect of a foreign wage change for interior solutions is derived in appendix A. Consider




















((1   )2 + 4(   1))
> 0: (10)
15As might be expected, a small increase in the foreign wage around the symmetric case implies
higher local union wage demands.
In the general asymmetric case an interesting relationship between local and foreign
wages emerges: under the quite weak (necessary and sucient) conditions  < 1=
p
2 and
m < (1   22)=(1   4) there exists a level of wF where wH reaches a maximum in function
of wF and further increases in wF lead to lower local wages. If these conditions are not met
wH is always increasing in wF.7 Following proposition therefore holds:
Proposition 6. For symmetric countries, a small increase in the foreign wage always leads
to an increase of the local union wage demands. For asymmetric cases with interior solutions
this does not hold: under weak conditions there exist a level of wF above which increases of
the foreign wage imply lower wages.
The left panel of gure 4 shows how the number of rms located in H, n (solid line),
changes in function of the foreign wage level for the general asymmetric case. The dotted line
shows the sensitivity of rm relocation to changes in wF as an elasticity, which is identical to
j
H
relocj.8 The right panel shows the corresponding union wage. In the left panel we see the





F . At moderate levels of wF, changes in the foreign wage do not greatly aect the
international distribution of rms (the n-curve is relatively at, the elasticity of relocation is
low), which is why unions make the largest wage demands at these intermediate levels of
foreign wages.
Discussion. It might be surprising that a foreign wage increase may lead to lower local
union wage demands, making wages act as strategic substitutes although the manufacturing
goods produced in both countries are substitutes.9 This property makes sense, however,
as in our model wages are rationally set in function of the marginal eect of wages on the
international rm distribution as expressed by jrelocj. A decrease in the level of foreign wages
always leads to a decrease of the local number of rms and runs counter to union interests.
This may simultaneously imply a decrease in the marginal eect of further wage changes
7Only if trade costs are very low or the country is quite large compared to the freeness of trade, local
union wage demands are always increasing with higher foreign wages. For empirically relevant values such as




relocj is directly related to the slope of n in function of wF, as @n
@wF
wF
n =   @n
@wH
wH
n =  reloc = jrelocj.
9See G urtzgen (2002) for a discussion of the strategic properties of union wages and an example where
the strategic properties of wages depends directly on the properties of the good market. See Corneo (1995),
Naylor (1998, 1999) for early examples of models where the reaction to the foreign wage level plays a key
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Figure 4: The international distribution of rms and the relocation elasticity (left panel) and the wage
bargaining solution in country H (right panel), as a function of the foreign wage wF.
on the distribution of rms, however, leading to higher optimal union wage demands in the
remaining rms. The fact wages are neither strict strategic complements or substitutes would
considerably complicate the analysis of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium where unions are
setting wages simultaneously in both countries.
Note that when foreign wages wF are lowered to the level w
CF
F (where c approaches c
CF)
and all rms start leaving H, the elasticity of relocation j
H
relocj in H approaches innity (see
equation (5)). The union wage demand then converges to the outside-option A-sector wage
w
A
H. It is intuitive that unions are willing to make ever larger wage concessions in such a
situation, in an attempt to retain some employment and obtain positive utility.
Models with xed union wage demands or wage bargaining outcomes (for example Picard
and Toulemonde, 2006) or models where wages are proportional to rm prots (for example
Head and Mayer, 2006) do not share this property, although rms are equally assumed to be
perfectly mobile in these models. This leads to inconsistencies, however, as one can imagine
cases where no rm is willing to locate in a country at this wage (resulting in 0 utility for
the local union), whereas lowering wages to some level between the reservation wage w
A
and the xed wage could attract a positive number of rms (resulting in positive utility for
the union). Point A in gure 4 is an example of such a point where a rational union would
want to lower its wage demands. The reason for the inconsistency is that although rms
are assumed to be perfectly mobile in the economic geography sections of these models, the
possibility of rm relocation is not subsequently taken into account by unions in the wage
bargaining stage.10
10For the case of rm level bargaining, which is more popular in the literature, the combined assumption
173.3. The eect of freer trade
A decrease in trade costs has an ambiguous eect on union wage demands.
Consider rst the case of full agglomeration, where the wage moves in line with the ag-
glomeration rents. Following proposition follows directly from the properties of agglomeration
rents as described in section 2.5.
Proposition 7. If the larger country attracts all rms, its wages are a hump-shaped function
of trade freeness. If the smaller country attracts all rms its wages are strictly increasing
with trade freeness.
But even when both countries contain rms an increasing freeness of trade may imply
higher wage demands, albeit in a rather specic conguration. Consider the case where
country F is suciently large to attract the industrial core for some intermediate levels of
trade freeness, even with the union wage in H (which is more a virtual wage, as there are no
rms in H) set equal to the level of the local alternative wage w
A
H. If the alternative wage
(and thus the minimal potential manufacturing wage) in H, w
A
H is lower than the alternative
wage in F, w
A
F, however, there exists a level of trade freeness  above which unions in H are
able to set a wage which is both above w
A
H (and thus wH increased after trade liberalisation)
and below the level where rms start relocating to H 11. Summarising, we have that
Proposition 8. For interior solutions, increasing trade freeness generally leads to lower
wages. An exception exists for the case of a small country with a production cost advantage
(a lower alternative wage w
A), but only if size asymmetries are suciently large and trade is
suciently free such that  > 2m. (proof see appendix B)
Figure 5 illustrates our results on the eect of  on union wages. The gure corresponds
to a situation depicted in the right panel of gure 2 where country H is able to attract all
rms between [
CH1;
CH2]. The left panel shows the case where the larger country H is the
unionised country under consideration. Foreign wages are assumed to be xed. Union wages
in H then are monotonically decreasing with freer trade as long as both countries contain
rms. Full agglomeration in H occurs between 
CH1 and 
CH2. Wages are a bell-shaped
of costless rm relocation and international prot equalisation in interior equilibria should give rms a perfect
outside option (relocation) during wage negotiations. Wages then should equal the alternative wage except
in the case of full agglomeration where international prot dierences may persist, creating a gap between
current prots and the outside option (foreign prots) for the individual rm bargaining with a union.
11In the limit, for  = 1, the country with the lowest unit labour costs is able to attract all rms, as is
obvious from c
CHj=1 = c
CFj=1 = 1. The country with the highest labour productivity, say H, is able to
attract all rms setting wages such that unit labour costs are marginally below the foreign level. This can be
seen from lling in c
CHj=1 = 1 in equation (9).
18function of  as the union appropriates the agglomeration rents over this interval. If the
smaller country F is unionised (right panel), wages decline with increasing freeness of trade
up to the level where all rms leave the country and wF = w
A
F. Wages are increasing for
the interior equilibria between 
CH2 and 
CF where rms relocate toward F (the exception
described in proposition 8) and continue to increase with full agglomeration in F beyond

CF, where the union appropriates the increasing agglomeration rents.
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Figure 5: Agglomeration rents and wages in the larger country (left panel) and the smaller country (right
panel) for large asymmetries.
Another interesting property of the model is the eect of freer trade on the sensitivity of






















Unfortunately, the expressions for the general asymmetric case are rather complex, but even
for the the cases of small deviations around the symmetric case c = 1 and m = 1=2 it can be
shown that
@2wH
@wF@ < 0. For  = 2 the expression simplies to
@2wH
@wF@ =  (1   )=((1 + )).
The reason why freer trade can make the union less sensitive to the foreign wage level is
that, while freer trade does increase the slope of wH(wF) as derived in equation (10) for the
symmetric case, this reects the eect on the slope keeping the level of union wages xed.
This `primary eect' of a change in  on the slope @wH /@wF is given by the term @T
@ in
equation (12). To measure the full eect, it has to be taken into account that changes in
19trade costs will also aect the level of union wage demands. Lower trade costs always lead
to lower optimal union wage demands in the symmetric case. Lower union wages are less
sensitive to foreign wages. The term @T
@wH
@wH
@ reects this `secondary eect' and as it turns
out, it dominates the primary eect for the symmetric case, causing freer trade to decrease
the sensitivity to foreign wages. For the more general asymmetric case this does not always
hold.12
Discussion. The result that decreasing trade costs may lead to higher union wage demands
is not unique to our model. In the two-country Cournot duopoly setting of Naylor (1999),
for example, labour demand increases with lower trade costs because the eect of additional
access to the foreign market exceeds the negative impact of increased domestic competition,
inducing unions to make higher wage demands. A very dierent mechanism is at work in our
model. The results for the eect of freer trade on wages under full agglomeration are derived
directly from the properties of agglomeration rents. For interior equilibria, the fact increasing
trade freeness may induce unions to increase wage demands stems, rstly, from the fact that
unions rst rationally lower their wage demands to the absolute minimum w
A when all rms
leave their country, and secondly, that trade liberalisation makes a large high-wage country
attractive only for intermediate levels of trade liberalisation. When trade costs become very
low the market size asymmetries become less important, and the country with the lowest
production costs will again be able to attract some rms. When this happens unions in the
smaller country optimally make some wage demand strictly exceeding w
A, and this wage
demand increases with freer trade.
3.4. Market size and union wage demands
A larger market size leads to higher union wage demands.
For the case of full agglomeration, this follows directly from the properties of the agglom-
eration rents. With a larger home market H can aord higher wages while keeping rms
indierent between locations.
12This eect also depends on union preferences: in our case the union tends to increase wage demands to
very high levels if the economy is rather closed. Subsequently, trade liberalisation has a strong disciplinary
eect. As lower wages are less sensitive to foreign wages this makes union wages less sensitive to foreign
wages after trade liberalisation. If U = nl(wH   w
A
H) with 0 <  the relative preference for wages compared
to employment, and  is suciently low, then union wage demands are less exorbitant in a closed economy.
The wage decrease is less pronounced after trade liberalisation and in this case union wages unambiguously
become more sensitive to after trade liberalisation.
20For interior solutions the eect of market size on union wage demands also is unambigu-
ously positive. For the symmetric case the eect is
@wH
@m





(1   )2 + 4(   1)
> 0:
Following the same approach as in appendices A and B it can be shown the eect of market
size on wages is positive in the general case with asymmetric countries. We therefore conclude
Proposition 9. A larger home market size leads to higher union wage demands.
A more surprising result is the ambiguous eect of market size on the sensitivity of
the wage bargaining outcome with respect to the foreign wage level. Unfortunately, the
expressions involved are rather complex and hard to sign for the general asymmetric case.







For  = 2 the expression simplies to 4(1 )=(1+)3. Numerical analysis shows that for a
large set of parameters an increase in a country's market size implies an increased sensitivity
to foreign wages. The reason is that, as with the eect of freer trade, a higher market
size always decreases the sensitivity to the foreign wage level when keeping wage demands
constant, but a larger market size simultaneously leads to higher union wage demands which
are more sensitive to foreign wage changes.
As can be seen in equation (9) a larger market always implies more sensitive wages in the
case of full agglomeration.
This counter-intuitive result runs contrary to the ndings of the literature on tax compe-
tition between asymmetric countries. For example Gaign e and Riou (2007) predicts higher
taxes and a lower sensitivity to the foreign tax level in larger countries. In models of tax
competition which consider full agglomeration (see for example Baldwin and Krugman, 2004)
higher foreign taxes lead to a higher local tax level. In most of these models, however, the
market size does not aect how the optimal local tax depends on the foreign tax level. This
is due to the fact taxes are a simply subtracted from rm prots whereas in our model wage
changes alter rms' production costs.
213.5. The eect of unions on the equilibrium distribution of rms
The focus of this paper was on how international rm mobility aects union wage
demands. This section briey considers the reverse question, on how union activity aects
the equilibrium distribution of rms. This issue has received more attention in the literature,
for example in the work of Picard and Toulemonde (2006). In their model, as in ours, all
labour shed by the manufacturing sector due to union wage demands is fully absorbed by the
CRS A-sector without aecting wages in that sector. Higher manufacturing wage demands
therefore may increase aggregate nominal income. In the model of Picard and Toulemonde
(2006) higher income implies more demand for manufacturing goods in a region and thus
union activity increases the attractiveness of a country. Our model is quite dierent in
that all income eects are absorbed by the demand for A-sector output. Higher wages in
the manufacturing sector then do not alter demand for manufacturing goods in a country,
causing wage increases to have an unambiguously negative eect on the protability of rms
and on the attractiveness of a location.
Consider the home market eect with unions setting wages in country H, with xed












and as @n/@wH > 0 (proposition 1) and @wH /@m < 0 (proposition 9) union activity reduces
the number of rms in the unionised country and attenuates the home market eect compared
to the case with competitive labour markets.
4. Conclusion
This paper analysed the optimal wage demand of a monopoly union acting on the
sector level in face of internationally mobile rms. Using a simple two-country new economic
geography model it was established how rms locate in function of trade costs and international
dierences in market access, labour productivity and wages. Unions fully take the results
on rm behaviour into account when making wage demands. It was shown that when both
countries contain rms (interior equilibria) the union wage demand is inversely related to the
amount of rm relocation in response to wage changes. When the country under consideration
attracts all rms, the union sets wages as to keep rms indierent between locations and the
union appropriates all agglomeration rents in the form of higher wages.
Under full agglomeration union wage demands are proportional to agglomeration rents and
therefore are a hump-shaped function of trade freeness in the larger country, and are strictly
22increasing after trade liberalisation in the smaller country if it is able to attract all rms.
But even when both countries contain rms wages may increase after trade liberalisation,
albeit in a specic conguration, where asymmetries are large and rms start to leave the
country with a larger market size and relocate to a smaller more productive country when
trade becomes suciently free.
Union wages are not pure complements or substitutes in an international context. Under
mild conditions, there exists a level of foreign wages above which a further increase in foreign
wages induces lower union wage demands. Although a foreign wage decrease hurts union
interests and reduces the number of rms in a country, the marginal propensity of rms to
relocate in function of union wage demands may simultaneously decline in the remaining
rms, leading to higher union wage demands in function of a foreign wage decrease.
When all rms are leaving the country (for example because foreign wages are set ever
lower), unions rationally lower wages to their outside-option, the wage level in an alternative
sector of employment which is assumed to exist. This intuitive property is lacking from
several well-known models of union wage demands with perfectly mobile rms.
For small deviations around the symmetric case, lower trade costs or a smaller market
size always lead to lower union wage demands, as might be expected. A counter-intuitive
nding is that, even when considering small deviations around the symmetric case, the lower
level of union wage demands in smaller and more open economies make the union wages
demands in these countries less sensitive to the foreign wage level.
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A. The eect of foreign wages




























24The denominator is negative at points where U reaches a maximum (and we know at least




H ], see condition 8), as it
represents the second order condition for a maximum. The sign of
dwH




























The reaction function therefore has a turning point at the level where
@reloc
@wF switches sign,
where reloc reaches a minimum as a function of wF as depicted in the left panel of gure 4.
Although readily interpretable, the exact expression in function of the model parameters is
rather complicated for the general asymmetric case and we omit it here.
When does such a turning point exist, where the bargaining function in function of the
foreign wage reaches a maximum? Note that the derivative of the bargaining outcome with
respect to the foreign wage, evaluated at the lowest level of the foreign wage for which the
home country contains some rms, equals
@wH
@wF
















In other words: the sensitivity of the wage bargaining outcome with respect to the foreign





3 when evaluated at w
CF
F . The slope of the
reaction function at w
CF
F is always positive (as depicted in the right panel of gure 4).
Evaluated at the other extreme, w
CH
F , where the high foreign wage induces all rms to
locate in H, and assuming  = 2 to assure concavity of the objective function and thus the
existence of a range of wages for which both countries contain rms, the slope of the reaction



















 4m + m + 22   1
4m2   22m2 + m2 + 22m   2m + 22 + 1
As the denominator can be shown to be positive, the sign of dwH=dwFjc=cCH equals the sign
of  4m + m + 22   1 and by solving for  and m we conclude the slope of the reaction
25function is negative at w
CH
F if  < 1=
p
2 and m <
1 22
1 4 . This is the case for common levels
of  and m. Under these conditions the reaction curve goes from positively sloped at w
CF
F to
negatively sloped at w
CH




F at the point where
jrelocj as a function of wF is minimal.
B. The eect of trade freeness
Proceeding as in appendix A the eect of a change in  on the bargaining outcome,

















Dividing by [(wH   w
A)l]=wH > 0 does not aect the sign. Substituting the rst order
condition (w   w
A)=w







and using l;w = @l
@w
w











This expression can be straightforwardly calculated from the long-run equilibrium denition
of n from equation (4) yielding a complex expression we omit here. From the point of view of
country H the expression (and therefore the eect of  on wH) can be shown to be negative
unless it holds combined that c < 1, m < 1=2 and  > 2m (the country under consideration
has a cost advantage, is small, and trade is suciently free) in which case it the eect of
freer trade on the union wage demand can be positive. These are necessary but not sucient
conditions, however.
26